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Author(s): Stanko Guldescu
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Yemen: The War and the Haradh Conference

Stanko Guldescu

A MINOR consequence of the war of 1914 was that the Turks evacuated the south Arabian country of Yemen which they had occupied since the latter part of the nineteenth century. Yahia Hamid al-Din, heir to the throne of the thirteen-hundred-year-old Imamate (Muslim theocratic monarchy) was able to reestablish the power of his dynasty. During his long reign he devoted himself to four principal tasks: the restoration of internal order which had collapsed altogether during the era of Turkish domination; keeping foreigners out of Yemen which came to bear the title of "the Tibet of the Middle East"; building up his treasury which also was that of the country at large; and buying surplus World War I weapons. The last he resold to the Ethiopians and others, or he stored in caves. The locations of these supplies were known only to members of his dynasty and trusted servitors.

Yahia achieved eminent success in realizing all of these objectives. His program of government, however, contained little room for modernization, progress, and other twentieth-century goals. As King and Imam of Yemen, Yahia considered that he had to guard his country against the infiltration of English spies. To him all non-Arabs were British agents in disguise. He feared that England intended to annex Yemen just as she had annexed Aden in 1839. Moreover, Yahia detested Christians in general and Protestant Christian missionaries in particular. As Imam (religious leader claiming descent from the Prophet through his daughter Fatima) Yahia had the duty of preventing the proselytization of his subjects by medical or other types of missionaries. On the other hand Yahia was unusually tolerant towards Jews of whom there were some sixty thousand in his domains.

Nor was the Imam so opposed to improving the material conditions of his people as his enemies alleged. Despite his suspicions he tolerated the presence in Yemen of foreign medical missions. He also encouraged his subjects to use the facilities of the excellent British-run dispensary in the neighboring Sultanate of Lahej. He built hospitals and schools and financed the education abroad of hundreds of young Yemeni. In the late 1920's and early 1930's the American plumbing magnate, Charles Crane, became interested

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in Yemen and induced Yahia to allow him to begin the technological renovation of the country. Yahia's second son, Prince Muhammad, was progressive-minded and probably persuaded his father to approve Crane's projects. Unfortunately the Great Depression caused Crane to abandon his investments in Yemen, and Prince Muhammad was drowned in an attempt to save one of his servants who had fallen into the Red Sea. Thereafter Yahia remained a complete isolationist until the end of his reign.[1] Even though he was a great admirer of George Washington, because he knew that general had beaten the British, he, also, distrusted American penetration of Yemen. Consequently, he turned down a million-dollar credit that Washington offered him in 1947.

Yahia was murdered in 1948 in a tawdry cloak-and-dagger plot.[2] Ahmad, the most unpopular of his sons, succeeded him. On Ahmad's death in 1962 the London *Times* provided this epitaph for him: "Imam Ahmad will be remembered for his success in preserving his kingdom virtually intact against all the political and social ideas of the twentieth century."

Reactionary though he may have been, Ahmad was surprisingly willing to make "deals" with the United States, Russia, and the Communist nations. Like his father he would have nothing to do with England, save open or veiled hostilities. To an American company he granted the first oil and mineral concession Yemen had made to a foreign concern. He signed a trade treaty with Soviet Russia which promised to build factories in Yemen and to give technical assistance to that country. Crown Prince Muhammad al-Badr toured Europe to intensify Yemeni economic relationships with the Communist bloc countries. Badr also concluded an agreement with Communist China which granted to Yemen a loan of 70,000,000 Swiss francs (about $16,380,000) for a ten-year period. The money was used to pay for the construction by the Chinese of a 200-mile auto highway, a textile mill, a cigarette factory, an aluminum factory, and other plants. The catch was that skilled Red Chinese technicians and workers came to Yemen along with the economic largesse.[3]

Ahmad and Badr understood well enough that it was dangerous to lie down with the Russian bear. But at the time (1956-58),

[1] *Le Monde* (Paris), April 5, 1955.

[2] Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Middle East. A Political and Economic Survey* (Oxford, Toronto, 1950), p. 202.

[3] *New York Times,* January 14, 1958.

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they were having serious disputes with Britain over the boundaries between Yemen and the Aden Protectorate. Badr declared that Yemen would accept aid from anywhere or anyone against the English. In pursuance of this aim the Mutawakelite Kingdom on March 8, 1958, federated itself with the United Arab Republic (Egypt and Syria). The new triple federation received the name "United Arab States." Ahmad retained his throne and absolute authority in Yemen. Also, for the time being, he silenced the attacks launched against him by Radio Cairo which could not very well continue its vitriolic abuse of an ally and colleague of President Nasser. Soon, however, Ahmad took alarm at the influx of Egyptian "advisers" and schoolteachers into Yemen. He published a poem which denounced Arab Socialism. This regal literary effort threw Nasser into a paroxysm of fury. On December 23, 1961, he ridiculed Ahmad in a Cairo broadcast and three days later dissolved the United Arab States. He also began to lay plans for the overthrow of the Imamic regime.[4]

Ahmad's diatribe against socialism had been stimulated by the presence in Yemen of 700 Chinese and 200 European Communists. The Chinese were spreading atheism and so earned for themselves a threat of expulsion.[5] Ahmad decided that he had better bring the United States onto the Yemeni scene in order to restore the desirable balance between East and West that he sought to maintain. He asked Washington to send shipments of wheat to relieve the agricultural distress resulting from the failure of the harvests in part of Yemen. During the first quarter of 1959 the United States sent six shiploads of wheat to Yemen.[6] Washington, also, offered Point-4 aid in the amount of $20,000,000 to build a highway between San'a and Ta'izz, the southern capital. The Americans were late in getting this road started and angered the Imam by importing the equipment they needed through British-held Aden rather than by way of the Yemeni Red Sea port of Hodeida.

Presumably, the American avoidance of Hodeida was caused

[4] See text of report submitted by the Egyptian Intelligence agent, Lieut. Col. Ali Fahmy, cited in S. Guldescu, "The Background of the Yemeni Revolution of 1962," *Dalhousie Review*, XLV (1965), 68-69. See also Harold Ingrams, *The Yemen: Imams, Rulers, and Revolutions* (New York, 1964), pp. 119-133, *passim;* Abdul-Ilah Abdullah, *Naksat al-Thaurah fil Yaman* (Setback of the Revolution in Yemen) (Beirut, 1963).

[5] *The Statesman* (Calcutta), July 29, 1960.

[6] *The Economist* (London), July 25, 1959.

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by the fact that the Soviets were building new port facilities there for the Imam. Over 300 Russian specialists labored for three years to construct this Port Ahmadi. Moscow granted long-term credits to San'a and sent all necessary equipment to produce a fine modern port with up-to-date docking facilities and loading equipment, complete with radio and electrical connections, oil storage tanks, cranes, warehouses, and living quarters for the dockworkers. Soviet Minister of Merchant Marine, M. Bakayev, said that in the twelve months previous to the formal opening 60,000 tons of goods had been unloaded at Hodeida. Western observers noted that military equipment was included among the items put ashore.[7]

Ahmad did not allow the American prejudice against using the Hodeida facilities to estrange him from the United States permanently. On January 22, 1960, he granted oil exploration rights to the newly formed American Overseas Investment Corporation.[8] A year later 600 houses were destroyed by a great fire in Hodeida and 3,000 people were left homeless. The Imam asked for and received emergency relief from the United States in the form of blankets, dried milk, wheat, flour, and a six-man medical team.

Not to be outdone either by their fellow Marxists or by Yankee "Imperialists," the Chinese announced the completion of the San'a-Hodeida highway. It seemed that Ahmad was getting help from all quarters for his kingdom, however successful he was in keeping the "political and social ideas of the twentieth century" out of Yemen.

These ideas got their chance to become operative when Ahmad, contrary to the predictions of all observers of the Yemeni scene, died of more or less natural causes on September 18, 1962. Badr succeeded him with the firm intention of modernizing the still medieval administration of the Mutawakelite Kingdom. He had only eight days to do this for on the night of September 26-27 a group of military officers staged a coup d'état, seized control of San'a, and proclaimed the establishment of a republic.[9]

This event initiated a three-year war, for Nasser followed in the footsteps of the Turks by sending an Occupation Army to Yemen.[10] Although the United States, West Germany, and the

[7] *New York Times,* March 27, 1961.

[8] *Middle East Economic Digest* (London), January 22, 1960.

[9] The most accurate of the several versions of this event is that provided in Harold Ingrams, *op. cit.,* pp. 129-130.

[10] *Al-Ahram* (Cairo), October 20, 1962.

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Communist bloc nations recognized the new republic, such forces as it was able to raise soon dissolved[11] and it remained a going concern thanks only to the military support afforded it by the United Arab Republic. Even the Egyptian Occupation Forces did not fare well in their battles with the armies raised by al-Badr. In 1962, 1963, and the first part of 1964 the Yemeni royalists inflicted heavy losses upon the invaders in hit-and-run partisan-type actions. A major Egyptian offensive directed against the royalist armies in August and September, 1964, failed, and from this time on the Egyptians suffered an unbroken series of disasters. By the late summer of 1965 their front in eastern Yemen had collapsed completely, and they were in trouble on the western, northern, and central fronts.

Nasser, therefore, decided to accept an offer of mediation tendered him by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia who was giving financial support to the Yemeni royalists. On August 23, 1965, the two executives concluded the Jedda Pact which put at least a temporary end to the war in Yemen. Nasser agreed (for the third time) to withdraw his army of occupation from the old land of the Imams. Saudi sources report that at Jedda Nasser said to King Feisal: "I beg you to save the prestige of the Egyptian Army."[12] The Jedda instrument also stipulated that the Yemeni royalist and republican delegates would meet together at Haradh on November 23 to set up an interim government which would administer Yemen until a plebiscite could be held to settle the monarchy-republic issue by ballots rather than by bullets.[13]

The Haradh Conference convened on schedule. It had three principal problems to settle: to determine the form of the political system that was to prevail until the plebiscite was held; to set up a functioning interim government; to determine the form and method of the plebiscite which was to take place not later than November 23, 1966.

During the first three days of the Conference the royalist, republican, and "Third Force" Union of Popular Forces got along

[11] *The Economist* (London), January 12, 1963, quoting the reports submitted by its correspondent in Yemen.

[12] Editor Hamed Mutawi' of the Saudi morning journal *Al Nadwa,* March 26, 1966. Note, too, the comment of *Al Thaurah,* the official Baathist organ in Syria, that Nasser had yielded to Feisal at Jedda and so betrayed the Yemeni revolution. (Issue of August 25, 1965).

[13] On this agreement see *New York Times,* August 22, 25, and 26, 1965; *New York Herald Tribune,* August 25, 1965.

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relatively well with one another, even though royalist Foreign Minister al-Shamy was angry because he could not implement the promise that he had made to bring either al-Badr or another representative of the dynasty to Haradh.[14] Suddenly, on the fourth day of the Conference, the attitude of the republican delegation headed by Abdurrahman al-Iryani, became intransigent. Al-Iryani sent letters to Nasser and Feisal saying that the republicans realized only after they got to Haradh that the Jedda Agreement had passed over the immediate claims of the republic in San'a as well as those of the Mutawakelite regime. It was the contention of the republicans that the Haradh meeting should decide once and for all that Yemen is a republic in which there is no place for the royal family. In particular the republican delegation insisted that the name "Republic of Yemen" should be used to designate the interim government that was to administer the country until the plebiscite could be held.

It may be that the republicans did indeed come to Haradh under the impression that the arrangement made between Nasser and Feisal at Jedda had implied definitive acceptance of the republic and abandonment of the Imamate. If so, this was a consequence of the fact that neither the republicans nor the royalists were represented in the Jedda conversations that were held concerning them. The republican interpretation of the "compromise" agreed upon between the Egyptian and Saudi rulers was that some of the royalist leaders could be offered lucrative posts in the republican regime.[15]

On the other hand, the republicans in private conversations with their royalist counterparts said that the Egyptian authorities had ordered them to support the republican regime unflinchingly. Hence, they were not able to express themselves with "complete freedom" in the official talks. After the third official session, which was held on November 30, al-Iryani told a royalist spokesman that the Egyptian Command in San'a had sent a warning to him and

[14] *Al Khawater* (Beirut), November 11, 1965. My account of the Haradh Conference and subsequent events is based on Arabic minutes of the Conference and other material received directly from correspondents in Yemen, both from the royalist and republican (occupation) zones.

[15] The April 25, 1964, edition of the *Manchester Guardian* questioned the existence of any "effective Republican Government" in Yemen, noting: "The Egyptians have had to take over the greater part of the civil administration of Yemen, in addition to exercising military control."

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his colleagues that they would be "buried alive" if they agreed to accept the principle of self-determination implied by the plebiscite provided for in the Jedda Agreement, or if they assented to the withdrawal of the Occupation Army from Yemen, or if they agreed to drop the use of the word "Republic" to describe the transitional regime.[16]

At Jedda Nasser himself had agreed that the interim government that the Haradh Conference was supposed to set up would not be designated a "republic." He had agreed to begin the withdrawal of his troops on the day of the first meeting of the Conference (November 23).[17] No Egyptians left Yemen on that day but a Soviet ship arrived at Hodeida loaded with new weapons for the Occupation Army and the republican Yemeni.

Although Nasser previously had broken promises made to the United States, to the UN, and to Feisal concerning the evacuation of his forces from Yemen, he may have intended to honor the Jedda Agreement. But from Jedda he had gone on to Moscow where he was preceded by an Egyptian military delegation.[18] The inference is that the Russians offered to underwrite any further military undertakings in Yemen to which he had to commit himself. In any case, while the Haradh Conference was still in session, 6000 fresh Egyptian troops landed in Yemen. Two more shiploads of arms arrived from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China sent 50,000 machine guns. The United Arab Republic became the first country outside of Eastern Europe to receive MIG-21D jet fighters, twenty of which were supplied to Nasser's airmen. Also the Soviet Union wrote off a debt of $400,000,000 owed by Cairo for military equipment received.[19] At the end of the year the two countries signed in Cairo a trade agreement which obligated the Soviets to send to Egypt machines, minerals, crude oil, wheat, wood, various types of installations, and other products.[20]

[16] Note the statement made recently by Ibrahim al-Wazir, head of the "Third Force" element in Yemen, printed in *Al Nadwa,* April 7, 1966, concerning the Haradh talks. Besides reporting the above-cited facts al-Wazir declared, "Egypt, which signed the Jedda Agreement, was seeking to destroy it." He accused Nasser of "torpedoing" the Conference.

[17] *Al Ahram* of October 30, 1965, announced that the troop withdrawals would begin in September and would continue over a seven months' period at the rate of 10,000 men a month. Only one Egyptian regiment was to remain in Yemen.

[18] *Le Monde* (Paris), August 28, 1965.

[19] *New York Times,* December 30, 1965.

[20] London *Times,* December 31, 1965.

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The United States, too, seemed anxious to shore up the Egyptian cause in Yemen. At the beginning of 1965 the House of Representatives became so aroused against Nasser as to ban further aid to Egypt. The immediate grounds were the disclosure that the Occupation Army was being fed American food, and the open attacks launched by Nasser and his press and radio organs upon the United States.[21] For their part, the State Department and President Johnson argued that it was in the national interest of the United States to supply Egypt's needs, however nastily the Egyptians accepted American munificence. On June 22, Washington agreed to resume the shipment of surplus agricultural commodities, including 260,000 tons of wheat, to the United Arab Republic. This first $37,000,000 handout to Cairo was followed in October by the gift of another $11,600,000 worth of agricultural commodities put together by private charitable agencies (acting under Government inspiration). This contribution was exempt from the congressional amendment which had prohibited further aid to the United Arab Republic save by presidential fiat.[22] All of this subterfuge was unnecessary. At the beginning of November the State Department announced that the President had decided that the resumption of regular surplus food sales to Cairo was "essential to the national interest of the United States." He, therefore, had authorized diplomatic negotiations for a new United States-United Arab Republic agreement. On January 3, 1966, Washington announced the sale of $55,689,000 worth of surplus agricultural commodities to Egypt, thus freeing the Soviet Union of the necessity of diverting to Egyptian ports any more of the Canadian and Australian wheat that it had purchased.[23] The American Government, also presumably in the "national interest," arranged to reloan to the United Arab Republic the Republic's currency that Cairo supposedly paid for part of these surplus goods.[24]

This competition between the Russians, the Chinese, and the Americans to prop up Nasser explains why the Egyptians wrecked the Haradh Conference and repudiated the pledges that Nasser had given at Jedda. It is no wonder that Third Force leader,

[21] *New York Times,* January 26, 1965.

[22] *New York Times,* October 26, 1965.

[23] According to the *The Economist* of September, 11, 1965, this emergency diversion of Russian wheat had to be kept secret from the Russian public because of the bad wheat harvests and food shortages in Russia.

[24] *New York Times,* January 6, 1966.

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Ibrahim al-Wazir remarked: "Both East and West are now kindling the resumption of the war in Yemen, paying no heed to who kills whom. The Communists are supplying the Egyptians with weapons whereas some Western countries[25] are supplying them with wheat and dollars."[26]

While the Haradh meetings were going on, Egyptian troops stationed in Khawlan al-Tayal Province attacked the villages of Daun, Eshboub, and Ma'yanah, all of which had supplied manpower to the royalist armies during the period of hostilities. Egyptian planes dropped explosive and incendiary bombs on the royalist community of al-Shagaderah and neighboring areas. In the northern city of Sa'da, ancient stronghold of the Imams of Yemen, the occupation forces seized Sheikh Haidar al-Mausimi and fifteen royalist soldiers who were returning to their homes after the conclusion of the cease-fire. These individuals were shot by the legionnaires without trial. In the al-Soudah area Nasser's forces employed Russian tanks to patrol the roads and pick up suspected royalists who seldom were heard of once the Egyptians got their hands on them.

Radio San'a waged a campaign of bitter invective against all of the participants in the Haradh talks. Even the republican spokesmen were threatened.[27] The regime in the capital put arms in the hands of schoolboys and street elements and encouraged them to intimidate not only royalist sympathizers but also the families of the republican delegates themselves. It is no wonder that, beginning with the fourth session of the Conference, al-Iryani and his colleagues insisted that the regime to administer the nation prior to the holding of the plebiscite must be republican. In this meeting of December 6 he added that the Jedda Agreement had not infringed the existence of the republican government in San'a which "shall stay forever."

This remark produced an explosion on the part of the royalist delegation which already was highly irritated because no members of the royal family were allowed to take part in the deliberations. The royalists now declared that the proper business of the Conference was to set up a provisional government. It had no competence either to declare the continuation of the republic or

[25] In the years 1964-65 France loaned Egypt over $100,000,000 including a long-term credit of $30,000,000. See *Le Monde,* October 17-18, 1965.

[26] Statement of Ibrahim al-Wazir reported in *Al Nadwa,* April 7, 1966.

[27] *Ibid.*

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to suggest the exile of the dynasty. King Feisal supported this view.[28] Dr. Rashad Far'aun, chief of the Saudi element in the Joint Saudi-Egyptian Observation Body, which had the task of enforcing the peace agreed upon at Jedda, issued a note to refute al-Iryani's declarations. The permanent form of government was to be decided by a free plebiscite of the Yemeni people. Far'aun also sent a cable to Nasser asking him to express publicly his interpretation of the agreement that he had made at Jedda with Feisal. The Egyptian President has not replied to this request nor has he advanced any explanation for his silence on the matter.

On one occasion during the Haradh talks al-Iryani suggested that the royalist and republican delegations hold an immediate referendum among themselves to decide whether Yemen would be a monarchy or republic. After the dissolution of the Conference he said in a press interview that the royalists "dodged" this issue. The fact is that the royalist delegates asked him if he was advancing in all seriousness the plan of an immediate vote on the monarchy-republic issue. They felt that his suggestion was not in keeping with the terms of the Jedda Agreement but they were willing to agree to a "spontaneous plebiscite" on one condition. This condition was that the Conference, as a whole, immediately adopt a resolution demanding the complete and undelayed withdrawal of all Egyptian armed forces from Yemen. Otherwise a "spontaneous plebiscite" could not be conducted in a "free atmosphere."

The royalists also expressed their opinion that fifty men (twenty-five royalists and twenty-five republicans) could not claim to represent the whole body of potential Yemeni voters and had no competence to decide between themselves so vital an issue as the question of the permanent or even temporary form of government. The legitimate task of the Conference was to set up an interim regime. The two twenty-five-man delegations had no right to anticipate the will of the Yemeni people by opting for one or the other of the two competing governments.

Since there appeared to be no possibility of breaking the deadlock the Conference meetings were suspended following the fifth official session. The republicans suggested that the talks be resumed

[28] *The Economist,* December 11, 1965. For the Saudi stand see also *Al Bilad* (Riyadh), November 27, 1965; *Al Nadwa,* November 29, 1965; *Al Madinah* (Riyadh), December 10, 1965; *Al Bilad,* December 10, 1965.

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on February 20 after the conclusion of the holy Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. When the royalists refused to fall in with this plan the republican delegates departed from Haradh.

The consequence of the breakdown of the Conference is that both sides are getting ready to renew the military phase of the struggle. Actually, the fighting already has started again. Hostilities opened with a revolt of tribesmen living in the Ra'da area, which is still in the possession of the Egyptians. Under the leadership of Sheikh Ahmad Nasir al-Zahab the clansmen captured Ra'da, broke down the gate of the prison there, and freed a number of royalists who had been incarcerated in it. Republican elements took their places in the cells. Ra'da is twenty miles northeast of the important city of Dhamar. Although it is deep in the Egyptian zone of occupation al-Zahab's Ghaifa tribesmen have raised the royal standard of Yemen over the place.

Since the end of the Haradh meetings the Chinese-built San'a-Hodeida highway has been cut at a point approximately one hundred kilometers southwest of San'a and some fifteen kilometers from Bajil, first city on the Tihama coastal plain leading to Hodeida. This new insurrection deep in the occupation zone was aided by Mahweet tribal troops and follows the new pattern of attempts to liberate occupied territories that are out of contact with the main royalist armies which are still obeying the orders of the Imam to observe the cease-fire provided by the Jedda Agreement. Native Yemeni republican forces trained in Egypt, have counterattacked the royalist partisans out of Hodeida. In this engagement the republican military commander at Hodeida, Colonel Muhammad al-Barawy, and Staff Colonel Muhammad Hasanain were killed.

A house belonging to President Sallal in San'a has been heavily damaged by a bomb explosion and five republican security officers, including Colonel Muhammad Zeid al-Awedi, have been slain by royalist "Fifth Column" elements in the capital.

These events make it clear that the royalist delegation that went to Haradh did not have the full backing of its own faction. A majority of al-Badr's followers did not wish to stop fighting last August when they had the Egyptians on the run. Although they finally accepted the idea of the plebiscite they insisted that the existing institutions of the Yemeni monarchy should not be discussed, let alone impaired, during the period of the transitional regime. Since the royalists control some three-fourths of Yemen

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it is easy to see why the republican spokesmen at Haradh insisted so stubbornly upon retention of a republican designation for the interim regime. Abandonment of this nomenclature would in all probability result in the royalists taking control of the interim government by default.[29] While the Haradh meetings were going on, the great Hashed and Bakil Confederacies along with the Sahm Beni al-Husein, Beni Nauf, Anes, Wa'ilah Amlah, Khawlan ben Amer, Juma'a, Shaghaderah, Hajjah, Mahabeshah, Hajoor al-Yaman, al-Ahnoom, al-Mahweet, al-Haimatain, and hundreds of smaller tribes renewed their allegiance to the Imam. They indicted the republican regime in San'a as "alien to Arabism and to Islam." There is no substitute, they said, for the thirteen-hundred-year-old Imamic system.

Thus the lines are clearly drawn in Yemen. The Haradh talks broke down over republican insistence upon the use of the word "republic" to describe the interim regime that was provided in the Jedda Pact.[30] There is no prospect of the resumption of talks between the republicans and royalists. And the Egyptian Army of Occupation, fortified by Russian, Czech, and Chinese weapons, and by American food and dollars, is remaining in Yemen. Nasser has withdrawn most of his troops into the cities such as San'a, Hodeida, and Ta'izz. Even Sa'da, chief town of the north, has been abandoned to the royalists.

The Turks tried this tactic, too. It took the war of 1914-1918 to expel them from Yemen. If the Saudis again decide to back the royalists, a general Armageddon may appear in the Middle East, for the Arab monarchies and republics will have to take sides with Riyadh or Cairo as the case may be. Obviously the Israelis are likely to try to take advantage of such an Arab internecine conflict. Arab awareness of this is the greatest deterrent to the outbreak of a general war between the Arab monarchies and republics, or even to "official" renewal of the fighting in Yemen itself.[31] But how long even so manifest a threat as this will serve

[29] The weakness of the republican movement in Yemen is well brought out by Abdul-Ilah Abdullah, himself a republican sympathizer, in his work cited above.

[30] *The Economist,* January 1, 1966.

[31] Al-Wazir recently reiterated repeated charges made by Yemenis of all categories that one reason why Nasser is keeping his army in Yemen is that by so doing he has an excuse for avoiding war with Israel. Al-Waziri's is only the latest in a long series of indictments of Israel as being one of the chief fomenters of the war in Yemen. See *Al Nadwa,* April 7, 1966.

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to control Arab tempers is a matter of conjecture. Feisal has been three times tricked and deceived by Nasser.[32] Although he wants to keep his country out of war, if he can do so with honor, and although he realizes that he is running the risk of playing into the hands of the Israelis, the Saudi monarch has come to the conclusion that he cannot do business with Nasser any more than European governments could with Hitler in the pre-1939 era. And Feisal realizes the danger to his own nation from the stabilization of the Egyptian situation in Yemen and the continued presence in that land of large groups of Russian, Czech, and Chinese Communists.

The latter are standing in the wings of the Yemeni political stage waiting for the moment when they hope to collect the usurious interest that they intend to exact for the loans, industrial credits, and miliary aid that they have given the Egyptians and to the Yemeni republicans.

[32] *New York Times,* August 25, 1965. A "disengagement agreement" was effected between Nasser and Feisal through American and UN auspices in 1963. They also arranged a cease-fire to take effect on November 8, 1964. Nasser promised solemnly on both occasions that he would take his troops out of Yemen. See *Christian Science Monitor,* November 6, 1964; *New York Times,* November 9, 1964.

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